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An ethnographic analysis of drug-centred cryptomarket community and exchange, this article explores the 
embedded values around drug distribution and consumption within this setting.  Drawing on our interviews 
with cryptomarket users, we analyze the ways in which users claim the cryptomarket as a space of morality, 
empathy, trust, reciprocity, knowledge transfer, harm reduction and self-limitation.  The anthropological 
concept of the morality of exchange is central to our theoretical approach.  
Methods 
Between December 2014 and July 2017, nine interviews were undertaken with users of drug cryptomarkets.  
These were conducted in person, using Skype video calling, and using the encrypted ‘self-erasing’ chat app 
Wickr.  The researchers also used overt non-participant observation (NPO) within the cryptomarket forum.  
This two-pronged approach - interviews and spending time within the community via NPO - enabled a thick 
description style of ethnographic analysis. 
Results 
Our research reveals online drug markets less as perfect markets (working to rules of supply and demand) 
and more as constructive communities of interest that perform and negotiate drug use and supply.  We found 
that participation within these interest communities had practical impact such as changing the type of drug 
that users consume and the ways in which they participate in street drug supply.  Significantly, these values 
and actions mediate the interface between online action and ‘meatspace’ (the offline world) and reinforce 
that the motivations and processes of internet activity are just as ‘real’ as offline action.   
Conclusion  
We redefine the illicit drug focused cryptomarket as a place of exchange, mediation and reciprocity.  Real-
time knowledge transfer with the aim of harm reduction is one example of the impact of cryptomarket 
interaction. We caution that this is not a space of kinship and affinity: it is not without its scams, hackers and 
threats.  It is, however, much more than a ‘drug marketplace’ and to understand how users themselves 
conceptualise this space is fruitful for any understanding of cryptomarkets.  Cryptomarket exchange is a 





r/darknetnoobs with FAQs1: Why a morality of the 
illicit? 
Cryptomarkets are online sites for the exchange of illicit goods and services that make use of the 
Tor darknet and its qualities of anonymity and hidden hosting (Martin, 2014: Barratt et al. 2014). 
Cryptomarkets are themselves a hybrid of several technical systems. As well as being hosted within 
the darknet, payments are made using peer to peer cryptocurrencies, such as bitcoin and Monero. 
Drugs are delivered through public postal services and private couriers. To users the cryptomarkets 
appear as a web market selling the wares of many vendors. To this technical infrastructure is added 
the wider social infrastructure of supporting discussion forums on the darknet and the open clearnet 
on which vendors, buyers and other parties exchange information, criticise and assess different 
products and share experiences. There is a tendency to see these places as meeting points for 
exchanges of goods, intelligence, contacts and personnel: there remains an assumption that trade 
is depersonalised. We conceive cryptomarkets as reflecting a ‘morality of exchange’ (Parry and 
Bloch, 1989) through which users account for their actions and those of others. Cryptomarkets have 
been particularly subject to myth-making as they intersect with similar claims about the motivations 
of drug vendors and market administrators as being driven by financial gain (The Economist, 2016).  
They may appear to many participants as transparent, economically motivated markets that place a 
premium on quality, service and stealth. However their activities are as motivated by a desire for 
social relationships and status recognition and community membership that helps to situate users 
within a moral framework (Barratt et al 2014a)). Non-economic motivations and justifications are 
crucial to understanding the activities undertaken in cryptomarkets (Munksgaard and Demant, 2016, 
Ladegaard, 2017a) and we offer a framework for conceptualising them. They are central to how 
participants approach cryptomarkets and act within them.   
Cryptomarkets are both novel and familiar. They form a small proportion of the overall drug market 
((Hall and Antonopoulos, 2016, Kruithof et al., 2016). They are mainly focused in a few European 
countries, Australia and the USA (Winstock et al, 2017). We argue that their significance is much 
greater in terms of how information is disseminated through them, as much as their role in being a 
conduit in the illicit supply chain (Martin, 2014). Although they account for a small percentage of the 
overall drug market they intersect with other parts of the illicit and licit economy in new ways afforded 
by their technical and social structure (Aldridge and Décary-Hétu, 2014; Hall et al., 2017). Their 
significance is partly in the greater efficiency they bring to some aspects of the middle market and 
retail market in illicit drugs but also in the new orientations they allow drug users and dealers to 
develop which is where we situate our paper. 
Our approach is to recognise the productive qualities that attract cryptomarket users and through 
which they reformulate and account for their practices. Cryptomarkets are composed of many 
different individuals with different motives. Some want a quick profit, others provide harm reduction 
advice, and still others seek to demonstrate their technical ability or provide social supply for friends 
(Barratt et al. 2014b: Barratt et al 2016a, b). As in other studies, the generation of a political or 
personal commitment is important in keeping members participating (Maddox et al., 2016: 
Munksgaard and Demant, 2016). So there are many different roles, some of which are designed into 
the cryptomarkets (such as the division of labour between administrators and vendors) and some of 
which arise within them (such as the checking and verification role of particular discussion forum 
participants). Motivations that might be thought of as strictly pragmatic (such as for better quality 
drugs, cheaper or more convenient) have been to the fore. However this may not be true and could 
be part of the mythology that has sprung up around them. Drugs on the cryptomarkets are not 
significantly more potent, are not always more convenient to obtain than in the face to face market 
(Barratt et al, 2014), nor cheaper (van der Gouwe, 2017). They are more predictable and consistent 
in some aspects and possibly involve less risk. So cryptomarkets are not quite the universal drug 
                                                 
1 One participant, Elias, explained to us that there is a ‘great deal of knowledge [exchange]’ 
surrounding the darknet.  He gave one source as the FAQs on Reddit sub-reddit ‘r/darknetnoobs’ 
and it is this we reference here.  
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tuck shops of critics’ imaginings. We hypothesise that their attractions lie elsewhere, in validation 
and confirmation of the autonomy of users and allowing for a demonstrably moral market to emerge. 
Our approach uses insights from the anthropology of markets and exchange to frame the activities 
of cryptomarket users, acknowledging that ‘Humans are motivated by social fulfilment, curiosity, and 
the pleasure of mastery, as well as instrumental purpose, competition, and the accumulation of 
gains.’ (Gudeman, 2001: 1) As such, any economy consists of ‘market’ facets and ‘community’ 
facets. The two might be defined as ‘mutually dependent, opposed or interactive’ (ibid). Our research 
hypothesises a novel composition in which ‘market’ and ‘community’ form a hybrid.  
Markets: Meaningful formulations and cultural relations 
An understanding of ‘cultural economics’ is helpful here. Material action is formed through practices 
other than economic - such as the religious or societal - and cannot be separated from them.  Further, 
there is no ‘true’ model of economy or market or marketplace that cryptomarkets aspire to or fail to 
reach. In fact, economy, market and exchange exist as multiple meaningful formulations in their 
specific - and changing - cultural contexts (Gudeman, 2001). Parry and Bloch argue that we must 
‘focus on the cultural meanings that surround monetary transactions’ and that ‘money [here, 
exchange] must be seen in the cultural matrix that forms it’ (1989: 1). We agree that these must be 
considerations about how exchange occurs, given that it is culturally embedded and cannot be 
understood in isolation. However, we would expand on this to argue that cryptomarkets not only defy 
a reductionist approach to the marketplace but also challenge new definitions of markets themselves. 
The anthropology of exchange brings us to concepts of reciprocity, obligation and expectation 
(Malinowski 2014, Mauss 2000 [1925]). Sahlins (1972) found that between relationships and 
reciprocity, transactions outwith pre-existing relationships could result in ‘negative reciprocity’ (a 
transaction to the benefit of one party and detriment of the other) and that community transactions 
promote balanced reciprocity and that familial transactions can create generalized reciprocity, 
whereby an individual may act in the interest of another before their own self-interest.  One might 
assume that cryptomarkets are selfish spheres of negative reciprocity. Our findings show they are 
far more nuanced than that.   
Inspired by this general concept, we have here taken our participants’ experiences of the 
cryptomarkets and related them to community. Rather than existing ‘outside the community’ in a kind 
of ‘unreal’ space, cryptomarket transactions in the form of both economic and knowledge exchanges 
create and maintain social, community relations. This is the sense of cryptomarkets as a social and 
political space (Maddox et al., 2016: Munksgaard and Demant, 2016) and also as a reciprocal space. 
This is true in the ‘meatspace’, the offline wold where online and ‘real-life’ interactions coincide and 
especially so in cases where cryptomarket users have instigated positive reciprocity, for instance in 
offering harm reduction knowledge and advice. Law enforcement actions form part of the 
constellation of risk judgements that inform the actions of vendors and buyers which often mean a 
reluctances to ship across borders. Recent work has noted the regionalisation and localisation of 
cryptomarkets (Demant et al, 2017). We then have two kinds of boundedness. There is the risk 
community, defined by the borders of the state, where cryptomarket vendors are incentivised to keep 
their trade within a geographic area. Then there is the moral community which subsumes it.  
What do we mean by a morality of exchange? Firstly, it is imperative to consider any monetary 
transaction as culturally constructed. On the cryptomarkets, we encounter circulation, exchange and 
consumption. One might expect that the anonymous platform is perfectly aligned with the impersonal 
market-place. Money is said to depersonalise social relations and anonymity on the internet arguably 
does so also - yet anonymity does not inevitably lead to depersonalisation [redacted]. Yet, when we 
add to this our particular context of illicit transaction, we see in fact a re-emergence of cultural 
relations.  
 
Our aim in this paper is to understand the morality of exchange in cryptomarkets using ethnographic 
methods. We explore how they construct the morality, comprehensibility and accountability of their 
activities. Central to that are the thresholds they lay down which which transition them between 
different moral categories.   
 5 
Methods 
We had to understand the multiple positions people occupy in relation to their cryptomarket activity 
and how they position and account for their activities by using methods that actively engage with 
them. To do that we needed to conduct in depth qualitative interviews focused on themes that were 
co-constructed with respondents. We conducted nine interviews with cryptomarket users, with two 
follow ups and some ethnographic observation of their activity while they used the cryptomarkets. 
Interviewees were recruited through word of mouth, Facebook and in one case the interviewee 
approached one of the authors via Twitter. Interviewee data was supplemented with observation of 
discussion forums linked to the top 5 cryptomarkets at the time of writing. Participants were well 
embedded in the cryptomarkets and the darknet community more generally, so are not typical of the 
many thousands of cryptomarket users who have much briefer and more pragmatic engagement 
with the cryptomarkets.  
Cryptomarket users who participated in the Global Drug Survey give us some idea of their population 
characteristics (Barratt et al., 2017). Compared to survey respondents as a whole, cryptomarket 
users were younger (24 years compared to 40 years), largely male (87% male compared to 67%) 
and more active in the clubbing scene (Winstock et al., 2017). These demographics were reflected 
to some extent in our interviewees who were majority male, based in the Europe and the USA and 
mostly in their 20s and early 30s. However two interviewees had much longer engagement with the 
drug markets, stretching over several decades. 
We can infer from the geographical locations vendors commonly shipped to and the kinds of idioms 
used by participants in cryptomarket forums that we studied that they are mainly native English 
speaking, and that vendors and customers are primarily based in the US, UK and Australia with 
some also in other Western European countries. In our study, for example, our participant Friso is 
Dutch and Rakesh is German.  It has been claimed that to undertake ethnographic research in online 
illicit spaces is essentially problematic. We suggest that this conclusion is born of a definition of the 
ethnographic method as existing vertically in one space over extended time. This risks rhetorical 
artificiality. Our position is instead horizontal: following people, transactions, drugs, and ideas as 
they move through different spaces, nodes and contexts in one time, expanding on the digital trace 
approach (Décary-Hétu, and Aldridge, 2015; Barratt et al 2016b). In taking this position, we follow 
the theory of Marcus (1995) that multi-sited ethnography does not mean simply mean fieldwork in 
more than one space over extended time. Rather it means leaving behind the bounded field-site and 
instead following people, commodities, exchanges, metaphors, and stories, as they themselves 
transform. A key principle of participant observation is using the tools, methods and spaces that 
those involved in the culture you are studying so. We used virtual private networks, self-destructing 
chat apps and Tor to get as close as we could possibly be in a setting saturated with the illicit.  
The study received ethical approval from the School of Social and Political Sciences. Interviewees 
were engaged in illegal activity which presents risks to them from participating in the research. As 
part of the process of protecting interviewees we discussed potential risks with them and how to they 
could be minimised, for example our use of pseudonyms in this paper. Each interview process was 
tailored to how best ourselves and the interviewee thought they might be conducted. Some used 
encrypted chat, others were face to face but without being recorded. Chat interviews extended over 
many hours with one lasting well into the night. Chat was particularly useful for fitting the interviews 
around the interviewee’s own life and allowed them to drop in and out of the interview as suited them. 
We employed Ethnographic Content Analysis (ECA) to reflexively analysing interview content. It is 
used to understand the communication of meaning (Altheide, 1987) and ensures maintenance of 
reflexive and narrative richness. 
 
Meet the players 
First Elias, he’s a student.  He ended up here in the cryptomarkets due to an interest in Bitcoin and 
Tor and hoped to gain knowledge.  His drug use previously hinged on friend networks and his 
experience of the crypto market changed the type of drug he took.   
Next we have Rakesh, initially he thought the cryptomarket was too good to be true.  Now, he thinks 
it gets a ‘bad rep’ and finds it great for security and drug quality. 
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Adam, he’s a student.  He admits he hasn’t been as ‘safe’ on the darknet as he could have been: he 
taught himself how to use it and didn’t care much about anonymity.  He lost a small amount of Bitcoin 
in a scam and realises now that he wants a minimal footprint on the darknet. 
Erik found the darknet scary.  He felt one needed technical knowledge and experience to navigate 
it, so asked a friend to ‘accompany’ him.  They used the friend’s computer, Erik was ‘too scared’ to 
access this on his.  Erik soon decided that ‘if you like taking drugs the darknet is just f***ing heaven.’ 
Rufus is very pragmatic about the cryptomarket.  He treats it exactly the same as a street deal: he 
‘restricts’ himself to the same drugs he buys on the street, plans what he needs in advance and 
keeps it for a long time.  He doesn’t binge or rush a purchase.  He sees his cryptomarket experience 
as ‘intelligence gathering’ and an exercise in caution. 
Teemu is a chemistry student and, as well as a drug marketplace, views the darknet as a platform 
for his own knowledge.  It is a place where he can provide helpful advice and support, particularly 
around harm reduction. 
Friso is idealistic and well-versed in drug taking.  A former street dealer, Friso says he became ‘too 
successful’ which drew him into a violent world and a prison sentence: ‘drugs were not just drugs to 
me, they were everything.  It was always more, I wasn’t just addicted, I want to know everything and 
try everything’.  Friso indexes all the drug-related information he can find and collates technical 
information about the darknet.  He says he wants his experiences to ‘mean something’ and uses the 
darknet as a platform for this. 
Then there is Peter.  He ‘was always a nerd’ and that’s what brought him to the darknet.  He even 
has a degree  that he funded by ‘reselling good deals’ in the cryptomarket. 
Chidi tells us that he sees the darknet as a place of self-expression, where he can share ideas, find 
freedom and non-conformity.   
Irreducibility of the marketplace 
Cryptomarkets are communities composed of multiple layers. One way of conceptualising this would 
have been according to the degree that users are ‘inside’ the cryptomarkets. Users certainly 
occupied different positions in it. However we wanted to understand the dynamic driving them to 
embed themselves in different ways. We found it according to the kind of reciprocity that they enact 
within the cryptomarkets or experience while using them. For example, one can be ‘outside the 
community’ and embedded within the cryptomarkets if one is the victim or perpetrator of a scam. We 
also acknowledge how users refer to ‘meatspace’. Again this could be seen as simply the offline 
world of face to face drug exchanges. However crucially meatspace signifies that offline market as 
one which is more and more articulated and mediated through the cryptomarkets.   
Our participant, Chidi, was keen to assert that the cryptomarkets were not just a criminogenic or 
exchange space: ‘One misconception about the darknet is that it's all about illicit activity.  I tend to 
see it as an opportunity to express ideas, ideals, and non-conformity.  I use the darknet because I 
like hearing sources of information that I might not normally hear.’  Participants were keen not to 
have them simply seen as solely an economic mechanism, however sophisticated, in the sense of 
an Uber or Amazon. Our respondent Peter agrees with Chidi: ‘It is not as much like eBay as people 
claim.  The volatility means that there’s not too much need for infrastructure.  There is an assumption 
that the darknet is much more sophisticated than it is.’  
 Because of this volatility and secretiveness there is a wider support system. They, link closely with 
other systems that the participants use such as social media or Reddit - where, for example, Friso 
leaves vendor reviews - so the cryptomarket communities exist beyond the site of the cryptomarkets 
themselves.  
When sharing is not a form of exchange: reciprocity, 
risk and existing relations 
In its most basic terms, reciprocity can be either immediate exchange (direct barter) or delayed 
exchange (where it is eventually expected of the giver, such as a birthday gift).  Drug transactions 
on the cryptomarkets are illuminating because they oftentimes involve both of these reciprocal 
processes in one single transaction. Immediate exchange occurs as the vendor and buyer swap 
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substances for Bitcoin or Monero. Delayed exchange comes into play in various ways. For one of 
our participants, Elias, he stops purchasing on the street in favour of the cryptomarket. He offers his 
old street dealer a ‘good deal’ on some pills. When Elias uses his friend’s address for delivery, he 
states ‘I would split it with them effectively. So they would get some just for the risk of having it 
delivered to their address whereas I was in a pretty much zero risk environment so I figured it wouldn't 
be fair.’  Fairness and sense of self are integral to Elias and his behaviour within the drug 
cryptomarket.  
Elias passes useful information to his previous street dealers and then makes money from them by 
using his technical knowledge to cash out their Bitcoins for them. This isn’t solely about existing 
relations and sharing illicit substances socially: this rebalancing is an essential part of reciprocity. In 
both cases of delayed exchange, the buyer is engaging with a sense of their own moral balancing. 
This is in two forms: There are delayed exchanges with offline dealers and users which are mediated 
through the cryptomarket infrastructure as in this example with the dealer. And then there are 
exchanges which are entirely online which involve knowledge, drugs and bitcoin. Here, we note, 
sharing is opportunity and not obligation.  It is also substance dependent, as Adam explained to us: 
‘Sharing only if it’s a sharing drug.  Cannabis, yes.  Pills, no.’  This social supply involves drugs being 
distributed and taken in with a sense of commensality within friendship networks (Coomber et al, 
2015).  
What is interesting here is that knowledge is being treated in the same way. This might be technical 
knowledge of the systems involved and how to manage them: Rufus told us that he appreciates 
cryptomarkets for ‘intelligence gathering and caution to avoid getting scammed’.   Participants 
produced and shared market knowledge about how to interpret the various claims made by vendors 
on the market, knowledge about effective and safe drug use, and about how to engage with the 
community.  Two of our participants - Elias and Teemu - have academic backgrounds in 
pharmacology and chemistry respectively.  They both claim that sharing this knowledge with drug 
users on the cryptomarket is important to them in order to provide support.  As Teemu puts it: ‘I 
conduct reagent tests on [substance] purity and post the results online.’  Teemu adds that his drug 
use is ‘in a self-exploratory manner’ and he advises other cryptomarket members to always have a 
partner when using. 
‘Scary Money’: The middleman, his sense of self and 
the threshold 
Cryptomarkets have the potential to change buying and taking habits of the illicit drug industry.  More 
than this, they can change the perception and potential of selfhood, as mentioned for Elias.  Elias 
ventured online to avoid the middleman of the street deal. As his knowledge and experience grew, 
he found himself in the role he once actively avoided. He had a connection with the street dealers to 
whom he had felt himself morally indebted for ceasing to be a customer. Their connection 
transformed from obligation to opportunity when Elias realized that he possessed knowledge they 
did not - how to turn cash into Bitcoin and back - and could undertake this on their behalf.  He could 
use his technical knowledge of the cryptomarket to organize the dealers’ purchases for them.  This 
resulted in his gaining a profit of between 10% and 12% per order.  With this money, Elias funded 
his university tuition and living costs.  To invest positively in his future with money recouped from the 
illicit is a marker of the dichotomous nature of all of this. 
Elias reiterates this: ‘I don't need the money any more so I've just backed off from doing it because 
I don't want to take the risk if I don't need to.’ In this respect - In one supposed straightforward direct 
barter of selling and buying - Elias has done a number of things.  He has transformed himself: 
suddenly he is the middleman that he went online to avoid.  He explains this away by pointing out 
the virtual-reality of his role, of the drugs he says ‘I never actually saw them, I never touched them, 
I was never involved with any part of the physical connection with them’.  He has created an instance 
of meatspace where the cyber and the real meet and co-exist. Not only does it connect him to others 
- his existing friends, online connections, real-life dealers - it also redefines his selfhood in relation 
to drug buying and dealing.  It dawns on Elias that he can potentially become a dealer: 
 I've got this opportunity, I can provide you with this for incredibly low price, I'll take a little bit off the 
 top because you know I'm providing a service and there's risk involved at my end as well. But I can 
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 organise all the stuff, you still get an incredibly good deal. So lets say it was like 80 pence a pill or 
 something, or like £1 a gram for weed, erm then they would pay maybe £2, and I would get the extra 
 pound. So i would be making about, I mean I think I made about £3000 in a year doing that, so that's 
 not a lot but I was never dealing in particularly high volume. If i decided to expand that, and I  
 networked with more people then I could be making 20, 30 grand, easily. I backed off from that,  
 because that's scary money … But then there’s the whole other fear factor of do I want to be a drug 
 dealer? So eventually I just went off it. Reconsidered it a couple of times when I had really bad  
 financial situation but ultimately never went for it. 
How might we define ‘scary money’? What at point does the situation change, when is the opportunity 
not worth the risk?What we identify in Elias’ account is the threshold that the actor will not cross. 
That signals the importance of thresholds to those involved. Participants who were tempted to 
leverage their digital knowledge to engage in larger scale drug deals stepped back from ‘scary 
money’. That threshold is not an empty boundary: here, opportunity and obligation constantly 
reinforce and challenge each other. This starts to answer a key problem in drug market studies. We 
know a bit about why dealers start being involved in dealing, and a little about where they stop, which 
is called ‘desistance’. What we have little knowledge of is the limits they place on their own 
enterprises and participation in criminal markets and what defines those limits. Here, our research 
reveals the context of self-imposed limits and the reasoning behind drawing that line. This 
perspective gives us a handle on understanding how illicit market actors place limits on their action 
- limits that are not defined by the structure of economic opportunity but are defined by these other 
factors. 
Making and breaking trust 
The infrastructure of most cryptomarkets have in-built verification and validation methods to 
encourage trustworthiness of the sites. Others rely on community validation over time.  Within this 
process, we encounter a level of trust.  Vendors all go through an escrow process except for the 
most trustworthy of vendors.  How does such a circular process work?  
 [That] is where Grams2 comes in. f you search that you have a whole collation of all the reviews and 
everything, it's like the Metacritic for drugs. And you can basically [tabulate] on that score because it doesn't 
matter how much someone is willing to pay to make sure their name looks good if a thousand other people 
say ‘nah mate you're shite’. That's going to be the overwhelming opinion.   
 (Elias) 
It is when fake reviews appear on sites like Grams or Reddit that we once again encounter a certain 
morality and show of solidarity. If making too much money and becoming a dealer is overwhelming, 
what is causes this fear factor within the cryptomarket?  And where does morality come into this?  
Elias refers to what he calls a Public Service Announcement.     
 [Users] don’t want everyone else getting screwed over, [users] don’t want vendors getting busted  
 and things based off someone else being an idiot, so it improves their standard and the   
 administrators obviously have an interest in that as well because if someone gets arrested they’re 
 not going to be buying and selling anymore. 
Scamming by vendors and administrators was not a typical interaction but it was an expected risk: 
Our participant Erik was scammed and put it down to taking a chance on a vendor with a low 
reputation.  It should be added that Erik also felt the same sense of loss when his twenty pounds’ 
worth of Bitcoin was seized from a marketplace in an FBI crackdown.  The community reacts quickly 
when it suspects a scam is happening. One major site, Evolution, was the target of an exit scam in 
2015 where the market administrators disappeared with the large amount of bitcoin being held in the 
market. Users then collaborated to promote technologies and practices that were more resilient to 
this kind of scam such as multi signature escrow and spreading one’s purchases and sales across 
multiple markets.  
                                                 
2 Grams is a now closed dark net site which indexed crypto market vendors 
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Crypto-community: ‘They have a vested interest in you 
not dying’ 
Often the cryptomarket users’ actions towards each other come from one of two places. First, an 
assumption that they are doing the same thing at the same time and with the same motivations and 
experience.  Second, in reaction to the negativity from ‘others’ and stereotyping of drug users, they 
‘band together’ into a community in which members hold in their minds a mental image of their 
affinity.  This ‘banding together’ can take two forms: a sense of shared interest, experience and 
motivation - that we consider a community of interest - and a more radical, pro-active sense of ‘being 
on a mission’ - that we consider a tribe.  Tribes tend to originally stem from communities, whereby 
members who are, for instance, activists choose a more targeted path.  An example of this could be 
a tribe of hackers stemming from a community of coders.   
Cryptomarket users are a community of interest rather than a tribe.  However, to call them a 
‘community’ is importantly not to reduce them and their activities to shared interest and reciprocal 
care.  Their interest in each other and subsequent care for each other’s wellbeing is solely restricted 
to this specific shared passion and does not go beyond it.  For every user who claims ‘heaven must 
be missing an angel …that’s how it feels to help people out on the darkweb and it also helps keep 
the chain going’ (Friso), there is another who ascertains ‘If everyone is an adult and they want some 
f***ed up substance than that is on them. You want oxy? That's on you.’ (Chidi, emphasis ours). In 
some cases, users seek a sense of ‘care’ that they do not find on the street market: ‘My amphetamine 
vendor (he or she no idea) is a very friendly one. Always there if you have a question, or need advice. 
It’s trust. Even says 'take care or take it easy buddy' That didn’t happen when I had to buy washing 
powder on the streets’ (Friso): the vested interest in each other is very often self-serving. 
This is a common distinction that users make which is that the motives of cryptomarket users are 
different from those of the offline drug market and that cryptomarkets produce a different context of 
behaviour.  
 ‘People on the darknet are nicer, like I think it’s generally if someone offers you a line of cocaine in a 
 toilet they are probably not a trustworthy person to start off with. So there’s a certain selection bias 
 there. If you’re taking drugs with someone in a dirty nightclub toilet then they are probably not the  
 sort of person you want to be taking drugs with for a start whereas if you are taking drugs with  
 someone that you want to be taking drugs with then there’s that sense of community with them,  
 whereas [sounds like ‘the people are all afraid to do that’] are already outside of that, like feeling of 
 community, does that make sense?  Yeah, so this is a person who you know them and you have that 
 interaction with them and they have a vested interest in you not dying of an overdose or PMA or  
 whatever.’ (Elias) 
This describes a structure of obligation which supports peer harm reduction (Friedman et al., 2007). 
It describes a structure of knowledge creation and diffusion about ways to minimise the risks 
associated with drug use. This can involve adapting what might be called professionalised 
knowledge about, for example, overdose risk or the spread of blood-borne viruses into everyday 
drug using practice. It also operates as a site for the production of knowledge about drug safety. This 
is particularly important with new psychoactive substances or new combinations of drugs where 
there may be little knowledge among the professional community. Further, these knowledge 
practices can be sites that resist medicalised or other forms of harm reduction knowledge and use 
practical counter-knowledges that are generated and shared within the cryptomarket communities 
to generate a narrative of lower risk drug use.  
Here we are introduced to the concept of community on the cryptomarkets. How might this ‘vested 
interest’ be explained? 
 ‘So there is a sense of everyone bands together and tries to help each other out. There’s also a  
 general sense of, if we are all going to be clumped together in the eyes of the general public then we 
 need to present a united front. Like we want to avoid people dying or going crazy as much as we can 
 because it makes everyone look bad, so there’s an aspect of that but there’s also just the general 
 community aspect.’ (Elias) 
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The community is an entity which one acts towards and an infrastructure for different kinds of action 
(sharing, exchange, support) to take place. Exchange has the power to transform the nature of social 
relationships.  
We have established that there is an othering at play here. Users of the cryptomarkets justify, identify 
and make sense of their illicit activity by defining illicit activity that they deem more extreme, more 
dark. With pretended assassination markets, weapon sales, and at least one now closed market 
organised around sharing images of child abuse forming part of the darknet, such activity has  been 
described to us as ‘that’s the darker side of it all’ (Rakesh, a university graduate). Illicit drug 
cryptomarkets are therefore presented relatively as not dark, less dark, or shady. If these dark 
pursuits are markers of the immoral and the illicit, the drug cryptomarket is often presented as a 
place of knowledge and a quest for self-enlightenment. The authors’ own work was entangled in this.  
Our participant Friso showed an interest in the wider research of our second author, and set out to 
access a PDF version of an article. Finding that it would take an institutional subscription or a 
payment of 40€ to access the work, he explained: 
 OH MY GOD i am so sorry by the way, but up to 40 euro’s for a .pdf with the research 
 full text? I am afraid I pirated them all from you, but for a good cause. In the name of  
 knowledge?  
Here, Friso is talking about accessing an academic publication about the darknet not about darknet 
activity per se. Friso looks for understanding by arguing ‘the name of knowledge’.  Other participants 
situate their cryptomarket use in similar ways, for instance Peter did his degree thesis on criminal 
innovation on the darknet. Yet the claim to good cause, this pursuit of knowledge, is a theme that 
runs through our participants’ claims surrounding motivation. 
Discussion 
The cryptomarkets are no detached marketplaces. We found that transactional processes on the 
cryptomarkets can also be transformative: they have turned the anonymous into a caring, supportive 
place of morality (Maddox et al., 2016). Barratt et. al point out that, ‘It is encouraging that anonymous 
digital spaces can provide a place of refuge for people who use drugs to access like-minded others.’ 
(2016b: 56). 
Informal social regulation is part of the working of cryptomarkets (Morselli et al, 2017). Vendors use 
‘freebies’ to attract buyers and good reviews (Ladegaard, 2017b). We have expanded on that to 
understand how cryptomarkets' quality as open market exchanges sometimes masks how users 
embed qualities of reciprocity in them. The people we interviewed re-task and combine technologies 
such as the darknet and bitcoin along with online and offline communities to move along a spectrum 
of reciprocity. Returning to our starting point, cryptomarket users’ accounts of their motivations and 
their actions as moral and comprehensible are closely bound up. It was often the case that 
cryptomarket users were at pains to emphasise the difference between the cryptomarkets and the 
offline markets. Users in the cryptomarkets were said to be ‘nicer’, more accountable and generally 
the sort of people one would want to hang out with. This distinction was important to users but is not 
one that should be taken as definitive. Users in offline markets are equally motivated by moral 
considerations but the technical and social possibilities of the cryptomarkets allowed these kinds of 
behaviour to be noted, shared and valued. So one of the ‘affordances’ of the cryptomarkets is their 
ability to form moral communities and recognise and embed that. 
To reiterate, participants are highly experienced cryptomarket users and are not representative of 
many users who have briefer engagements with the cryptomarkets and will rely much more on the 
formal trust and reputation systems that they have in place. Like hackers, our interviewees get 
satisfaction from participating in terms they define and mastering several different technologies to 
do so (Stenmetz, 2015) and their position in relation to ‘the underworld’. Being at the heart of the 
underworld can give one a certain cachet but clearly draws the attention of law enforcement and 
rivals. It can be better to operate a few layers away from it, or better in an environment where there 
is no strict centre. Position and moral distancing are crucial activities. This involves practical actions 
such as covering one's traces and also moral acts that involve situating one’s actions within a moral 
frame from dark to light. There is always something darker. Putting this in context it does not mean 
that all or most users are ‘nice’. It does mean that users and vendors thought the kinds of interactions 
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it promoted were better. In some cases this is based on a myth about the offline market as being 
violent and chaotic, which it mostly is not.  
Likewise, building trust was reliant on joining or creating a culturally coherent community. Trust 
signals are performances which are carefully selected by both sellers and buyers (Holt et al., 2016). 
That helps them cope with the significant information asymmetry that exists in cryptomarkets. There 
is plenty of information on vendors such as evaluation scores and reviews but little verification. That 
extra verification is practiced outwith the market structure itself and in associated forums and in 
meatspace relationships. There is a layered onion of relationships which develop to ensure 
transactions are reliable. The cryptomarket infrastructure is one layer. Users develop other layers 
over time, such as relationships with vendors who are mediated through the cryptomarket but are 
not part of the public listings, relationships which are conducted through other systems such as email 
or encrypted messaging, or that move into meatspace. It is notable that as the relationships and trust 
increase, the security of the underlying system decreases somewhat. Conducting drug deals through 
email is not very secure and face to face interactions open both parties to potential stings. So greater 
trust can motivate users to move away from the cryptomarket infrastructure over time. 
Threats to economic exchange are different from threats to moral exchange. A successful drug 
purchase can be detailed by scams, failure of the market infrastructure, and interception of drugs 
sent through the post. A moral exchange can be threatened by it losing its reciprocal character. That 
can happen when a threshold is crossed. The concept of thresholds was developed in response to 
how cryptomarket users navigate the opportunities and risks presented to them. The ability to make 
use of their knowledge and connections to pull off large scale drug trades was a temptation to those 
who felt their digital skills would allow them to maximise returns and minimise risks. In the 
interviewee’s accounts there was a combination of push and pull factors. The push was the 
immediate need - to deal with a financial crisis or uncertainty - the pull the satisfaction in being able 
to demonstrate one’s status as a darknet entrepreneur. The concept of threshold has also been 
identified in research with drug dealers in offline markets sometimes choose not to fully enforce debts 
or seek negotiated outcomes with their debtors in order to maintain trust and allow the debtor to 
continue operating the market (Moeller and Sandberg, 2017b). Recognition of the limits of direct 
exchange within an overall sense of the market as being potentially damaged by violence or pedantic 
debt enforcement. 
Our findings call on us to rethink how significant non commercial supply is even in a vaunted fully 
capitalist market.  A key point in the illicit drug distribution network is the role of social supply and 
minimal commercial distribution (Coomber et al, 2015). This is where friendship or acquaintance 
groups arrange distribution among themselves for low or no profit. That kind of distribution is working 
through the cryptomarkets. Knowledge transfer is part of the cryptomarket.  This form of sharing 
becomes transformative in this context: much as Widlok (2016) states, here sharing as ‘enabling 
others to access what is valued, provides a conceptual and practical alternative to market exchange 
…The social practice of sharing is therefore a fundamental and independent part of the human 
repertoire of making a living’.  So when the cryptomarket buyer shares his or her wares with his pre-
existing friends, it is not a gift per se.  It is part risk-management and part deal.  Sharing has a role 
in the construction and maintenance of social order.  Crucially, Widlok asserts, ‘Instead of the 
obligations to give, to receive, and to return, the ethnography of sharing suggests a pattern of 
opportunities to ask, to respond, and to renounce’ (ibid.: 4).  ‘Sharing has proven to be an effective 
way of opening up opportunities for humans who seek access to what they need’ (ibid.: xviii).   
Cryptomarkets not only defy a reductionist definition of exchange, they also challenge the very 
definition of a market. There are many assumptions about what the street or offline market is which 
are reproduced by users and commentators. For example, that in person interaction is more 
trustworthy, more real, more emotionally binding or more permanent. The offline market does not 
generate these qualities by default. Where they do exist it takes effort by all involved to create 
through e.g. repeat interactions, mutual risk taking, shared liability etc - in face on of the ways trust 
is maintained is through shared ‘guilt/criminal liability - so for example the knowledge that I have 
done something illegal, which you also have, is used to create trust because we both share a secret 
about our criminal liability. You could call this balanced reciprocity. The cryptomarkets can involve 
relationships that are emotionally meaningful, obligatory and powerful for those involved.  What is 
new is that cryptomarkets reduce the role of shared criminal liability in establishing balanced or 
positive reciprocity.  
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We argue that some of these elements are what accounts for the resilience of illicit markets in general 
and cryptomarkets in particular. Extensive research on illicit markets on and offline notes their 
resistance to intervention and the fast recovery of cryptomarkets in the face of law enforcement 
interventions (Van Buskirk et al 2017; Décary-Hétu and Giommoni, 2017; Soska and Christin, 2015). 
We could point out that closure of cryptomarkets may have the perverse effect of damaging the 
positive reciprocity of the community while leaving the negative reciprocity largely untouched. 
Certainly, many respondents in this and other studies have lamented the fall of the original Silk Road 
and that the newer cryptomarkets are less concerned to root out scammers (Munksgaard and 
Demant, 2016). 
Parry and Bloch (1989) explain that it is the ‘unsettled relationship’ between market and non-market 
exchange that attracts most attention. Gift economies are said, by some, to build communities. The 
market economy, conversely, is said to serve as a kind of ‘acid’ on those relationships. We argue 
that the cryptomarkets inhabit and construct a new space of exchange.  Constitutive of the 
behaviours associated with gift exchange, cryptomarket transactions are imbued with similar 
relational motivations, obligations and interactions. The transaction’s concurrent shaping by buying 
and selling (direct barter) crucially does not result in the application of acid to those interactions: the 
relationship is not so much unsettled as it is constitutive of an innovative hybrid form of exchange.  
In this respect, we argue, cryptomarket transactions create and embody fluid boundaries in the 
sphere of exchange. In the neo-classical sense, market exchange is about equilibrium. We view 
action in the cryptomarkets in a different sense which involves rebalancing.  Reciprocity is about 
balance, a moral sense of balancing pre-existing relationships, the justificatory rebalance of ‘this is 
dark but other activities are dark dark’ and also the more abstract sense of rebalancing perceptions 
of the darknet: the concept of ‘nice people doing shady things’ epitomizes this. 
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